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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Atron Castleberry and John Brown are two African-
American males who were fired by Defendant STI Group, a 
staffing-placement agency (and thus a subcontractor) for 
Defendant Chesapeake Energy Corporation, an oil and natural 
3 
 
gas company.  Castleberry and Brown brought suit asserting 
that their termination was racially motivated, citing to various 
examples of discrimination such as remarks made at the 
workplace and unfair work treatment.  The District Court 
dismissed their complaint.  Because Plaintiffs state plausible 
claims of employment discrimination, we reverse and 
remand.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Castleberry and Brown were hired by STI Group in 
March 2010 as general laborers and supervised by managers 
from both STI Group and Chesapeake.  Shortly after being 
assigned to a particular worksite, the only other African-
American male on the crew was fired.   
 
 Plaintiffs allege that, when they arrived at work on 
several occasions, someone had anonymously written “don’t 
be black on the right of way” on the sign-in sheets.  They also 
assert that although they have significant experience working 
on pipelines (and more so than their non-African-American 
coworkers), they were only permitted to clean around the 
pipelines rather than work on them.  They claim that, when 
working on a fence-removal project, a supervisor told 
Castleberry and his coworkers that if they had “nigger-
rigged” the fence, they would be fired.  Seven coworkers 
confirmed that occurred.  Following this last incident, 
Plaintiffs reported the offensive language to a superior and 
were fired two weeks later without explanation.  They were 
rehired shortly thereafter, but then terminated again for “lack 
of work.”  
 
  Plaintiffs brought suit in District Court against both 
STI and Chesapeake alleging harassment, discrimination, and 
retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  As to the 
harassment claim, the Court determined it could not survive a 
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motion to dismiss because the facts pled did not support a 
finding that the alleged harassment was “pervasive and 
regular,” which it deemed a requisite element to state a claim 
under § 1981.  The Court similarly found that there were not 
sufficient facts alleged demonstrating intent to fire Plaintiffs 
because of their race or that their termination was racially 
motivated.  Finally, regarding Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim, it 
determined Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that an objectively 
reasonable person would have believed that the comment 
made by their supervisor was unlawful—a necessary element 
to plead retaliation under § 1981. 
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
  28 U.S.C. § 1291 gives us appellate jurisdiction.  We 
review anew a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim.  Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 
(3d Cir. 2015).  When conducting our review, “we must 
accept the allegations in the complaint as true, [but] are not 
compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and 
unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a 
factual allegation.”  Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 
(3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quotation omitted).  The allegations 
must have “facial plausibility,” meaning that “the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(citation omitted). 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
  Plaintiffs challenge the District Court’s dismissal of 
their claims under § 1981, which provides 
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All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State 
and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . 
to the full and equal benefit of all laws . . . as is 
enjoyed by white citizens . . . . 
 
In employment discrimination cases, these claims are subject 
to the same analysis as discrimination claims under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 
F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2009).  Accordingly, a court 
reviews them under the burden-shifting framework outlined 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
Brown, 581 F.3d at 182.  Under that framework, a plaintiff 
first must establish the requisite elements of his claim (called 
the prima facie elements); if so, the “burden then must shift to 
the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason” for the adverse employment action, and then the 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the employer’s 
stated reason for the adverse action was an excuse, or pretext, 
for why the action was actually taken.  McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802-04.  Using this approach, each claim is 
reviewed in turn. 
 A.  Harassment 
 Plaintiffs’ harassment claim under § 1981 alleges a 
hostile work environment on the basis of race.  To win, a 
plaintiff must show that “1) the employee suffered intentional 
discrimination because of his/her [race], 2) the discrimination 
was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally 
affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would 
detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like 
circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior 
liability [meaning the employer is responsible].”  Mandel v. 
M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted).  Plaintiffs assert that the District Court 
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applied the wrong legal standard in dismissing this claim 
when it required them to plead discrimination that was 
“pervasive and regular.”  See J.A. at 13 (emphasis added) 
(citing Ocasio v. Lehigh Valley Family Health Ctr., 92 F. 
App’x 876, 879 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Instead, they only were 
required to plead that they were subjected to a hostile work 
environment in which there was discrimination that was 
“severe or pervasive.”  See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 
449 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).   
 
 Plaintiffs are correct even though our precedent is 
inconsistent.  We have held that, to prevail on a harassment or 
hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff “must establish 
that . . . the discrimination was severe or pervasive.”  Mandel, 
706 F.3d at 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see Moore 
v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006); Jensen, 
435 F.3d at 449; see also Miller v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. 
Hosp., 565 F. App’x 88, 93 n.6 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation 
omitted); Brooks v. CBS Radio, Inc., 342 F. App’x 771, 775 
(3d Cir. 2009); Hamera v. Cnty. of Berks, 248 F. App’x 422, 
424 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).  
 
 We have also held that a plaintiff making such a claim 
must establish that the discrimination is “pervasive and 
regular.” Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quotation omitted); Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 260 
(3d Cir. 2001); see also Ullrich v. U.S. Sec’y of Veteran 
Affairs, 457 F. App’x 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation 
omitted); Ocasio, 92 F. App’x at 879 (quotation omitted).   
 
 To make matters even more confusing, we have also 
determined that the correct standard to apply is “severe and 
pervasive.”  Hare v. Potter, 220 F. App’x 120, 131-32 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  And if that were not enough, we have held that 
the correct standard to apply is “pervasive and regular” but 
then applied the “severe or pervasive” standard within the 
7 
 
same opinion.  Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 
(3d Cir. 2001).   
 
 Thus we clarify.  The correct standard is “severe or 
pervasive.”  The Supreme Court has articulated as much on 
several occasions.  See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 
U.S. 129, 133 (2004); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 
17, 22 (1993).  We have noted that “[t]he difference [between 
the two standards] is meaningful” because “isolated incidents 
(unless extremely serious) will not amount to [harassment].”   
Jensen, 435 F.3d at 449 n.3 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).  Indeed, the distinction 
“means that ‘severity’ and ‘pervasiveness’ are alternative 
possibilities: some harassment may be severe enough to 
contaminate an environment even if not pervasive; other, less 
objectionable, conduct will contaminate the workplace only if 
it is pervasive.”  Id. (quoting 2 Charles A. Sullivan, Michael 
J. Zimmer & Rebecca Hanner White, Employment 
Discrimination Law and Practice 455 (3d ed. 2002)).  
Whether an environment is hostile requires looking at the 
totality of the circumstances, including: “the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 
performance.”  Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.   
 
 Under the correct “severe or pervasive” standard, the 
parties dispute whether the supervisor’s single use of the “n-
word” is adequately “severe” and if one isolated incident is 
sufficient to state a claim under that standard.  Although the 
resolution of that question is context-specific, it is clear that 
one such instance can suffice to state a claim.  See Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 788 (“isolated incidents” will amount to 
harassment if “extremely serious”) (quotations omitted); see 
also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 
(2001) (per curium) (quotations omitted) (same); Jensen, 435 
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F.3d at 449 n.3 (same).  However, a plaintiff must plead the 
incident to “be extreme to amount to a change in the terms 
and conditions of employment” for it to serve as the basis of a 
harassment claim.  Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
 Defendants argue that there is no case in which our 
Court has held a single isolated incident to constitute a hostile 
work environment.  But they miss the point.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision to adopt the “severe or pervasive” 
standard—thereby abandoning a “regular” requirement—
lends support that an isolated incident of discrimination (if 
severe) can suffice to state a claim for harassment.  See 
Suders, 542 U.S. at 133.  Otherwise, why create a disjunctive 
standard where alleged “severe” conduct—even if not at all 
“pervasive”—can establish a plaintiff’s harassment claim?  
Defendants would have us read that alternative element out of 
the standard.  We may not do so. 
 
 Indeed, other Circuits have similarly held that an 
extreme isolated act of discrimination can create a hostile 
work environment.  See, e.g., Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainbleau 
Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[W]e 
underscore the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Faragher 
. . ., that an isolated incident of harassment, if extremely 
serious, can create a hostile work environment.”); Rodgers v. 
Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 
1993) (“Perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the 
conditions of employment and create an abusive working 
environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet 
such as [the “n-word”] by a supervisor in the presence of his 
subordinates . . . [that] impacts the work environment [] 
severely . . . .”) (quotation omitted); Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., 
LLC, 754 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2014) (although a 
racially offensive carving on a workplace wall “was an 
isolated act, it was severe” enough that a “reasonable jury 
could find that [plaintiff’s] work environment was objectively 
hostile”); Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. 
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Cir. 2013) (“This single incident [of using the “n-word”] 
might well have been sufficient to establish a hostile work 
environment.”).      
 We are unpersuaded by Defendants’ attempts to 
analogize this case to others in which an isolated incident was 
insufficient to establish a hostile work environment.  The 
facts of those cases are unhelpful.  For example, Defendants 
point us to Breeden, where two men and one woman met to 
review applications for a job opening.  The woman read aloud 
a sexually explicit comment contained in one application and 
the two men “chuckled.”  532 U.S. at 269.  The Court 
determined that because the “ordinary terms and conditions of 
[the woman’s] job required her to review the sexually explicit 
statement in the course of screening” job applications and that 
she “conceded that it did not bother or upset her to read the 
statement in the file,” the isolated incident was not so severe 
as to constitute harassment.  Id. at 271 (quotations omitted).   
 
 Likewise, Defendants’ attempted comparisons to 
nonbinding district court and unpublished Third Circuit 
opinions are of no help either.  See, e.g., King v. City of 
Phila., 66 F. App’x 300, 303 (3d Cir. 2003) (although a fired 
police officer was called the “n-word,” and for that reason we 
did in fact determine he “had established a prima facie case,” 
defendants carried their burden under the McDonnell-
Douglas framework of providing evidence of legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for his termination); Miller, 565 F. 
App’x 88 (did not deal with an isolated incident);  Al-Salem v. 
Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth., Civ. A. No. 97-6843, 1999 
WL 167729 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999) (employee who 
resigned to accept a higher paying job was called the “n-
word” but there was no evidence on the record that he was 
detrimentally affected).  
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  Here Plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor used a 
racially charged slur in front of them and their non-African-
American coworkers.  Within the same breath, the use of this 
word was accompanied by threats of termination (which 
ultimately occurred).  This constitutes severe conduct that 
could create a hostile work environment.  Moreover, the 
allegations could satisfy the “pervasive” alternative 
established by the standard.  Plaintiffs alleged that not only 
did their supervisor make the derogatory comment, but “on 
several occasions” their sign-in sheets bore racially 
discriminatory comments and that they were required to do 
menial tasks while their white colleagues (who were less 
experienced) were instructed to perform more complex work.  
Whether these allegations are true and whether they amount 
to “pervasiveness” are questions to be answered after 
discovery (for example, after determining how many times 
racial remarks were scribbled on the sign-in sheets).  
Plaintiffs have pled a plausible claim of a hostile work 
environment under either theory—that the harassment was 
“severe” or “pervasive.”  
 
 But most importantly, what Defendants and the 
District Court ignore is that in every case they cite the claim 
was resolved at summary judgment.  Under the McDonnell-
Douglas framework, a claim of employment discrimination 
necessarily survives a motion to dismiss so long as the 
requisite prima facie elements have been established.  That is 
so because “it may be difficult” for a plaintiff to prove 
discrimination “[b]efore discovery has unearthed relevant 
facts and evidence.”  Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 
506, 512 (2002).  Here, Plaintiffs have established those 
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elements, and thus their claims should not have been 
dismissed at this early stage of the litigation.1 
  
B.  Disparate Treatment Discrimination 
  Plaintiffs allege that they were the only black males 
assigned to their specific site, they were assigned undesirable 
duties, they were the targets of racial epithets, and they were 
fired twice due to their race.  They believe these allegations 
amount to evidence of discrimination under a theory of 
disparate treatment.  To establish a discrimination claim 
under § 1981, “a plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a 
racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of 
race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination concerning one 
or more of the activities enumerated in § 1981.”  Estate of 
Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 797 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).  Given the allegations noted, 
Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint satisfies each of these 
elements in stating a § 1981 discrimination claim.  See J.A. at 
39-40.   
 
 The District Court surmised that “absent additional 
factual allegations, there may be perfectly neutral, 
                                              
 1 Chesapeake also asserts that Plaintiffs’ harassment 
claim should be dismissed because they have not 
demonstrated the fifth element (respondeat superior liability) 
as to it.  “An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a 
victimized employee for an actionable hostile work 
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or 
successively higher) authority over the employee.”  Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 807.  This argument fails because the supervisor 
who used the racial slur accompanied by threats of 
termination was a Chesapeake employee. 
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nondiscriminatory reasons” for Plaintiffs’ adverse 
employment actions, and accordingly dismissed this claim.  
J.A. at 18.  Whether true or not, Defendants did not provide 
the Court with any of those potential reasons.  That was their 
burden to carry.  And, even had they done so, Plaintiffs still 
would have been afforded the opportunity to rebut the stated 
reasons as pretextual following discovery.  The District Court 
therefore was incorrect in dismissing this claim, thereby 
jettisoning the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework.      
 
 C.  Retaliation 
 Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their retaliation 
claim, which alleges that they were fired for reporting the 
racially discriminatory remark made by their supervisor.  To 
establish a retaliation claim in violation of § 1981, a plaintiff 
must establish the following prima facie case: “(1) [he] 
engaged in [protected] activity . . .; (2) the employer took an 
adverse employment action against [him]; and (3) there was a 
causal connection between [his] participation in the protected 
activity and the adverse employment action.”  Moore, 461 
F.3d at 340-41 (quotation omitted).  “In a retaliation case a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that there had been an underlying 
section 1981 violation.”  Estate of Oliva, 604 F.3d at 798 
(citation omitted).  In doing so, the plaintiff “must have acted 
under a good faith, reasonable belief that a violation existed.”  
Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 
2015) (quotations omitted).  
 
 Here the District Court dismissed this claim because it 
was unreasonable for Plaintiffs to believe that a single 
incident of a discriminatory remark (which was the only 
incident they reported in their complaint to Defendants) could 
amount to unlawful activity.  J.A. at 20 (citing Breeden, 532 
U.S. at 271).  However, this reasoning rests on the Court’s 
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finding that an isolated discriminatory remark cannot amount 
to a violation of § 1981 by incorrectly applying the 
“pervasive and regular” standard.  As discussed above, a 
single incident can amount to unlawful activity, particularly 
when applying the correct standard.  Accordingly, the case 
should be remanded on this claim so that it may proceed to 
discovery. 
 D.  Disparate Impact Discrimination 
 In their Second Amended Complaint Plaintiffs also 
alleged discrimination on a theory of disparate impact.  In 
addition to the allegations made in their disparate treatment 
claim, they allege that after they were fired there were no 
remaining African-American male employees at their work 
site, and thus Defendants intentionally implemented policies 
to prevent African-American males from working there by 
assigning them undesirable work tasks.   
 
 Although the District Court failed to address this 
claim, not doing so is irrelevant because a claim of disparate 
impact is unavailable under § 1981.  The Supreme Court has 
rejected “that a violation of § 1981 could be made out by 
proof of disparate impact . . . .”  Gen. Bldg. Contractors 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 383 n.8 (1982).  In 
discussing the history of the statute and distinguishing it from 
Title VII, the Court explained that § 1981 was enacted to 
prevent purposeful discrimination and “did not include 
practices that were neutral on their face . . . but that had the 
incidental effect of disadvantaging blacks to a greater degree 
than whites.”  Id. at 388 (quotation omitted).  Following that 
guidance, we held that “§ 1981 provide[s] a private cause of 
action for intentional discrimination only.”  Pryor v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Indeed, when comparing the two theories of discrimination 
brought under both Title VII and § 1981, we have explained 
14 
 
that a theory of “disparate impact” is brought “under Title VII 
alone” while a theory of “disparate treatment” can be brought 
under § 1981 as well.  Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 
F.2d 667, 669-70 (3d Cir. 1983).  Moreover, a theory of 
disparate impact is not supported by Plaintiffs’ allegations, 
which is that there is a policy that only African-American 
males will be assigned undesirable work, and only they will 
be fired if they complain about discrimination.  Those alleged 
policies are not facially neutral.    Accordingly, we will not 
remand as to this claim. 
 
*   * * *  * 
 
  Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged claims of 
harassment, disparate treatment discrimination, and retaliation 
under § 1981 to carry them over the motion-to-dismiss 
hurdle.  We reverse and remand so that the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework can be applied as the 
case proceeds through discovery. 
